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Abstract
Unlike usual approaches to military expenditures that concentrate on
foreign a®airs, this paper analyzes a strategic structure for a dictatorial
government to plan military expenditures concenrrating on domestic af-
fairs. Then we ¯nd two dilemmas: The dictatorial government may spend
less on military equipment if they have some destructive devices and then
citizens may have relatively larger disposable incomes in exchange for mil-
itary oppressions; and the dictatorial government increases military ex-
penditures as their economy grows to sap revolutionary interests. Based
on these results, I also make some closing discussions.
I am grateful to Peter Morgan for insightful comments through discussions.
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1 Introduction
Recent development in Economic History enables us to deal with various issues
of \institutions." A major thought among them is that institutions are formed
by con°icts among elites and non-elites{for example, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) and Engerman and Sokolo® (2005).
This paper extends the model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) to examine
how dictatorial institutions persist facing pressures of revolutions by introduc-
ing in°uences of military expenses. A notion such that some groups exchange
concessions to keep peace is not quite novel{for example, Azam (1995) and Roe-
mer (1985). The most advantageous feature of Acemoglu and Robinson is that
their model deals with a wide range of topics and very simple to easily extend
to obtain other implications as well as their e®orts of empirical veri¯cations.
In this paper, I mention two factors in°uence on military expenditures; in-
expensive mass destruction weapons and national income. It is not mentioned
a lot in Economics how mass destruction weapons in°uence on economy. How-
ever, some countries utilized cheap weapons such as biochemicals and actually
used against their opponents. For example, Iraq against Kurd and it is also
warned a fear of terrs by dirty bombs which uses coarse radioactive materials.
Those weapons are inexpensive and easily obtained by dictatorial countries. In
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practice, those weapons also bring fears to suppress opponents to make revolu-
tions. In this study, a parameter that represents destructions during violent ac-
tions represents mass destructive strategies. Then we ¯nd such abilities reduce
military spendings followed by lower tax rate arises as an equilibrium, which
indicates disposable income rises in exchange for su®ering by those weapons.
Relations among military expenditures and economic performances are fre-
quently studies topic{for example, see Cuaresma and Reitschuler (2006) and
Yakovlev (2007). This paper, however, studies a static model of incentives and
income levels are regarded as a parameter eligible for comparative statics. In
this sense, economy determines military spendings and then higher income raises
military expenses in order to sap incentives of revolts, which go up in accordance
with the accordingly higher income after the revolt succeeds, followed by higher
tax rate.
This paper develops as follows. I brie°y review the model of Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006) with some modi¯cations in Section 2 and Section 3 to extend
in Section 4. Then I make some discussions with regard to implications given
by this study in Section 5 as the conclusion.
2 The Base Model
With some modi¯cations, following two sections review the model of institu-
tional changes suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) to extend as the
base model of this study. They consider institutional changes as results of so-
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cial confricts between elites, say rich, and non-elites, say poor. In this model,
institutions change either by violent evente as such revolutions and coups or
concessions. The concessions, in their sense, are taken place by redistributing
incomes from the rich to the poor.
For more detail, let ± and 1  ± respectively be the fractions of the rich
and the poor such that 0   ±   1{2 (i.e., the poor is the majority of this
economy). Incomes of those two classes are respectively given by yr and yp
such that yr ¡ yp ¡ 0. Suppose policy packages are represented by tax rates
¿ P r0; 1s and the fraction of the cost of collecting tax revenues are repre-
sented by its cost function Cp¿q, which is at least twice di®erentiable, such that
C 1p¿q; C2p¿q ¡ 0 and C 1p0q  0. In addition, I assume C 1p1q ¥ 1 as well. This
cost function represents losses from collecting taxes; for example, opportunity
losses from economic activities while tax-payments and opportunity losses from
assignments of tax collectors who could produce economic goods{Okun (1975)
and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006). Then the subsequent lump-sum redistri-
butions are represented by Tr ¥ 0 to the rich and Tp ¥ 0 to the poor. In this
sense, redistributions must satisfy
±Tr   p1 ±qTp 
 
¿  Cp¿q¹y; (1)
where ¹y is the average income de¯ned as
¹y  ±yr   p1 ±qyp: (2)
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Let sub- and super-scripts i  tr; pu represent variables for each social class.
Then money metric utility for i is given by
V i  p1 ¿qyi   Ti: (3)
By a technical reason avoiding indeterminancy in collective actions followed by
Arrow (1950), the government determines the tax rate at ¯rst and then the
lump-sum redistributions.
Remark 1 If the government is dictatorial, Tp ¡ Tr  0 followed by ¿ ¡ 0
realizes as the equilibrium.
Proof: If the government is dictatorial, their social planner maximizes only
the utility of the rich subject to Eq. (1), so that the problem is
max
¿;Tp
p1 ¿qyr   Tr s.t. Tr  1
±
 
¿  Cp¿q¹y  p1 ±qTp ;
which is simpli¯ed to the problem
max
¿;Tp
p1 ¿qyr   1
±
 
¿  Cp¿q¹y  p1 ±qTp :
Hence the ¯rst order condition with respect to ¿ is given by
yr   1
±
  1 C 1p¿q¹y  0; (4)
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which is arranged to get
C 1p¿q  1 µ; (5)
where µ  ±yr{¹y is the fraction of income accrues to the rich, so that, 1  µ
represents that of the poor. By C 1p0q  0 and C2p¿q ¡ 0, ¿ ¡ 0 at the optimum.
Because the ¯rst order condition with respect to Tp is negative, Tp  0 holds
and then Tr ¡ 0. ¥
3 Revolutionary Constraint
Consider a possibility of revolution that succeeds with some cost represented by
the fraction lost in the violence ¹ P p0; 1q. For simplicity, the rich is completely
purged after the revolution. Then the poor brings about the revolt if
p1 ¹q¹y
1 ± ¡ p1 ¿qy
p   Tp: (6)
A similar notion such that economic gains from revelions attract participants is
also argued by Weinstein (2005).
Remark 2 Under the revolutionary pressure, Tr  Tp  0 followed by ¿  0
holds at the equilibrium.
Then the rich solves the problem to maximize their utility Eq. (3) subject to
Eq. (1) and Eq. (6). In particular, they solves the reduced form problem such
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that
max
¿
p1 ¿qyr   Tr s.t. Tr  1
±
 
¿  Cp¿q¹y  p1 ±qTp
Tp  p1 ¹q¹y1 ±  p1 ¿qy
p;
which is simpli¯ed to
max
¿
p1 ¿qyr   1
±
  ¿  Cp¿q¹y  p1 ¹q¹y   p1 ¿qp1 ±qyp : (7)
The ¯rst order derivative is then given by
yr   1
±
  1 C 1p¿q¹y  p1 ±qyp ; (8)
which is arranged to get the ¯rst order condition
1
±
  1 C 1p¿q¹y   ±yr   p1 ±qyp  C 1p¿q
±
 0: (9)
Therefore, ¿  0 is the equilibrium of this model. ¥
Note, at the optimum, the revolutionary constraint is given by
µ ¡ ¹: (10)
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4 Revolutionary Constraint, Continued
This section extends the original setting of Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) to
introduce the probability of revolution settled p which is in°uenced by military
expenditures M . Let p  ÁpMq such that Áp0q  1, Áp ¹Mq  0 and Á1pMq ¡ 0
for 0   M   ¹M . In addition, I assume Á1p0q  8 and Á1pMq  0 for M ¥ ¹M .
With the military expenditures, the budget constraint Eq. (1) is rewritten as
±Tr   p1 ±qTp  M 
 
¿  Cp¿q¹y: (11)
In this case, we have the probability of revolution settled but do not know when
it ends. So that the expected payo® to the poor after the revolution is given by
8¸
t1
p1 ¹qtp1 pqt1p
1 ±  ¹y 
p1 ¹qp
1 ±  ¹y 
8¸
t1
p1 ¹qt1p1 pqt1
 p1 ¹q¹y
1 ± 
1
p1 ¹q   ¹{p : (12)
Therefore the revolutionary constraint is now rewritten as
p1 ¹q¹y
1 ± 
1
p1 ¹q   ¹{ÁpMq 
p1 ¹q¹y
1 ±  F pMq ¡ p1 ¿qy
p   Tp: (13)
Because there is no incentive to invest on arms if there is no incentive for the
poor to revolt, I consider the situation such that
1 ¹ ¡ p1 ¿qp1 µq; (14)
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which indicates it is better to bring revolts if it succeeds in the next period.1
Under Eq. (14), the dictatorial government has no incentive to transfer conces-
sions more than just. Then the problem for the dictatorial government is given
by
max
¿
p1 ¿qyr   Tr s.t. Tr  1
±
 
¿  Cp¿q¹y  p1 ±qTp M
Tp  p1 ¹q¹y1 ±  F pMq  p1 ¿qy
p:
Lemma 1 There exists an optimum tax rate ¿  ¿ such that 0   ¿   1 and
it is unique.
Proof: The optimization problem of the dictatorial government is simpli¯ed
to the problem such that
max
¿
p1 ¿qyr
  1
±
  ¿  Cp¿q¹y  p1 ¹q¹yF pMq   p1 ¿qp1 ±qyp M : (15)
Note, we have
BF
BM 
¹Á1pMq p1 ¹qÁpMq   ¹2   0; (16)
BM
B¿ 
 
1 C 1p¿q¹y: (17)
1If ¿  0, Eq. (14) coincides with Eq. (10). Technically, this constraint ensures p P p0; 1q
at the optimum. If Eq. (14) is not satis¯ed, the revolutionary constraint is slack and then
M  0 is the optimum spending on arms, so that, the problem is identical to the one studied
in Section 2.
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Then the ¯rst order condition is given by
yr   1
±


p1 ¹q¹y  BMB¿ 
BF
BM  p1 ±qy
p

 0; (18)
which is rearranged to get
BMB¿ 
BF
BM 
1
1 ¹: (19)
By the assumptions, the left hand side Eq. (19) is in¯nity at ¿  0 and attains
zero at some value ¿  a   1. For example, Figure 1 depicts the case in which
there is some value ¿  b ¡ a such that Á1pbq  0. Then we can ¯nd ¿  ¿ as
the equilibrium such that 0   ¿   ap  1q. ¥
Theorem 1 Under the revolutionary pressure, M ¡ Tp  Tr  0 followed by
¿ ¡ 0 holds as the equilibrium.
Proof: Let V be the value function for Eq. (15) to apply the envelope theorem
to get
BV
BM 
1
±


p1 ¹q¹y  BFBM  1

: (20)
At the optimum, by Eq. (16) and Eq. (17), Eq. (20) is given by
1
±


p1 ¹q¹y  1p1 ¹q¹y 1 C 1p¿q  1

 1
±
 C
1p¿q
1 C 1p¿q ¡ 0; (21)
where the last inequility follows from C 1p¿q ¡ 0 and 1C 1p¿q ¡ 0 by BM{B{¿ ¡
0 at the optimum (see Figure 1). Therefore the rich wishes to spend all tax rev-
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enues on arms, that is, M ¡ 0  Tr  Tp given that ¿ ¡ 0 by Lemma 1. ¥
Theorem 1 tells us the dictatorial government facing pressures of revolutions
levies tax to ¯nance military expenditures to enforce their regime that contrasts
to the case discussed in Section 3{the government cannot control the probablity
of revolution succeeds.
Theorem 2 If p{p1 pq ¤ ¹, then ¿ is decreasing in ¹ and so does M .
Proof: Both sides of Eq. (19) are increasing in ¹ because it is obvious that
1{p1 ¹q is increasing in ¹, BM{B¿ is irrelevant to ¹ and
B2F
BMB¹ 
Á1pMq   ÁpMq  ¹  ¹  ÁpMq p1 ¹qÁpMq   ¹3 : (22)
The numerator of Eq. (22) is rewritten as
Á1pMq   p ¹  p1 pq; (23)
which is strictly negative if p{p1  pq ¡ ¹ and weakly positive if p{p1  pq ¤ ¹
because Á1pMq   0. For p{p1 pq ¤ ¹, it reveals
B
B¹ 

BMB¿ 
BF
BM


  0: (24)
Those arguments imply the downward shift of the left hand side and the upward
shift of the other side of Eq. (19), hence, the optimum tax rate goes down{for
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example, Figure 2 depicts a case which brings a change in tax rates from ¿ to
¿ such that ¿ ¡ ¿. ¥
Theorem 2 provides a result of comparative statics about the destruction rate
¹. Given the likelihood ratio of the probability of revolution succeeds not to
be larger than the destruction rate, an increasing in the destruction rate brings
lower tax rate and following smaller military expenses. In other words, the
dictatorial government that successfully supress the possibility of regime changes
at su±ciently low level reduces the tax rate to reduce their military expenses
if revolutions are getting destructive. In particular, the distruction rate will
rise if arms improve at the same cost or if they introduce cheap but e®ective
mass destruction devices such as biochemical weapons or nuclear weapons as
an extreme. In this sense, the fear of those weapons reduces the pressure of
revolutions to reduce tax rate while it reinforces the dictatorial regime.
Theorem 3 ¿ is increasing in ¹y and so does M .
Proof: We have B2M{B¿B¹y  1C 1p¿q and that is positive around the equi-
librium, so that, it is true that
B
B¹y 

BMB¿ 
BF
BM


¡ 0: (25)
Because the right hand side of Eq. (19) is irrelevant to ¹y, it implies only the
opward shift of the left hand side, so that, the optimum tax rate goes up and
so does M . ¥
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Theorem 3 exhibits an interesting feature of the dictatorship. An increase in
their national income raises the pressure of revolutions and then the dictatorial
government spend more on military expenditures.
Remark 3 We obtain following implications from the model:
1. Mass destruction devices may increase disposable income of the dictatorial
nation while it brings large fears to the inside of the country.
2. Economic growth in a dictatorial country brings more miltary expenditures
followed by larger tax rate to supress higher incentives to make revolutions.
5 Closing Discussions
Despite usual analysis on military expenditures which consider in terms of neigh-
bor countries' military a®airs, this paper analyzed the relation among an dicta-
torial government and citizens applying a simple model of revolutionary threat.
Then some new characters are found: Introducing destructive devices may in-
crease disposable incomes of citizens because of increased threat of tragic con-
sequences for revolutionists (Remark 3-1); and economic growth will increase
military expenditures because of increasing rewardsafter revolts for citizens (Re-
mark 3-2). Although appropriate empirical data is not available, those ¯ndings
are intuitively plausible in the real world. For example, behind the genocide
applying chemical gases against Kurdish and the military oppression against
Sunna Muslims, Iraqi enjoyed relatively higher living standards under the reign
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of Sadam Hussain at least until the economic embargo by the United Nations.
Although majorities are not directly oppressed, demonstrations against minori-
ties and politically opposite groups have some in°uences on majorities. Inclusive
such military actions, giving presentations for citizens about the attitude of the
government has been important.
Now our world faces a dilemma, whether or nor to bring a regime change.
That is, everyone agrees physical oppressions shall be eliminated from the said
country but some may claim the country has been stable until the regime change.
That is really observed in the aftermath of the Iraq War. With regard to this
point, I believe any dictatrial governments that suppress human rights shall be
removed and then the world community consider reformations.
The second implication is that the dictatorial government need to prepare
for revolts when the economy goes well in order to sap any incentives to chal-
lenge against the government. Then military expenditures relative to their na-
tional income necessarily increase. If oppressive demonstrations are necessary
to show the power of the dictatorial government, we have again a dilemma,
whether or not to support economic progress of such countries. The western
countries have kept providing supports expecting economic growth brings de-
mocratization. However, the fastest growing country is Communist China and
they continue oppressing Tibet and people inside the country behind their eco-
nomic growth on the shore. In addition, the international community cannot
control Chinese military expansion. With this point, I also believe democrati-
zation shall be the ¯rst and then economic supports. Otherwise human rights,
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which have been the most important concensus among the western countries
after the World War II, are outraged by dictators and accepting those regimes
imply we accept the end of our common ideology \Democracy."
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